Finding a Workable Exception to the Work Made for Hire Presumption of Ownership by Vo, Chau
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1999
Finding a Workable Exception to the Work Made
for Hire Presumption of Ownership
Chau Vo
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chau Vo, Finding a Workable Exception to the Work Made for Hire Presumption of Ownership, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 611 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol32/iss2/8
FINDING A WORKABLE EXCEPTION TO THE
WORK MADE FOR HIRE PRESUMPTION OF
OWNERSHIP
The United States Constitution confers upon Congress the power
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' Congress ex-
ercises this power through copyright legislation.2 The most recent
legislation, the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act),3 provides pe-
cuniary incentive4 to produce and create works by granting owner-
ship of a copyright to the work's creator or "author."5 The Copyright
Act entitles authors to a limited monopoly in their works, 6 carefully
balancing this economic incentive with the need to disseminate
works to the public.
The "work made for hire" doctrine is a narrow exception to the
basic rule that the creator is the owner of the copyright. The doctrine
grants ownership rights not to the creator but to (1) the employer
whose employee created the work within the scope of his or her em-
ployment;7 or (2) the party commissioning the work, if the work falls
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
3. See id.
4. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt,
distribute, perform and display copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1994). The owner of a copyright may choose to forego payment for his crea-
tion in lieu of retaining full ownership rights of the copyright because of the
value that it holds. One advertising executive recalled receiving very little
compensation for his work for the defendant but stated that he "agree[d] to cre-
ate a television commercial for [the defendant's] use provided that [he], not
[the defendant] would retain all rights, including any copyright, to th[e] com-
mercial after its production. [He] wanted those rights because [he] knew that
commercials could generate licensing revenues for the owners of such rights."
Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, 654 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
6. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
7. Congress intended that works made for hire falling under this category
be the product of the traditional employer-employee relationship in which the
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within one of the nine categories enumerated in the Copyright Act
and there is a written and signed agreement indicating that the work
is to be made for hire.8 In the absence of any written agreement to
the contrary, the Copyright Act presumes the employer to be the
owner of the copyright. 9
The operative theory behind the presumption is that when a
party hires an employee to create a copyrightable work, the fruits of
the employee's endeavors properly belong to the employer.'" The
employer often initiates the creative process and without such initia-
tion, many creative works would not be undertaken.1 The employer
also bears the risk of commercial failure while the creator will be
paid regardless of whether the work is ultimately commercially suc-
cessful. Thus, the employer's mandate to the employee and the
scope of the employee's employment contemplate the creation of
copyrightable material for the employer's benefit.
Although the Copyright Act presumes that an employer is the
owner of the copyright, there are situations where an employer
should no longer be entitled to benefit from its employee's creative
employee gives up authorship in his or her creation in exchange for a regular
salary and other employment benefits. Cf 133 CONG. REC. 12,957 (1987)
(statement of Sen. Cochran).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)-(2). The specially commissioned work provi-
sion is narrow, requiring both a signed and written agreement, and that the
work in dispute fall into one of the categories enumerated in subsection (2).
See id. § 101(2). The rescission analysis which follows infra applies to inde-
pendent contractors to the extent that the commissioning party materially
breached its agreement, and that this breach went to the essence of the bargain
between the parties.
The express writing requirement of the work for hire provision serves two
primary objectives. First, the writing requirement serves as a statute of frauds
so that written agreements, rather than oral ones, govern the distribution of
copyrights in the "for hire" setting. See Armento v. Laser Image, Inc., 950 F.
Supp. 719, 730 (W.D.N.C. 1996), affd, 134 F.3d 362 (4th Cir. 1998). Second,
a written agreement makes clear and definite the ownership of property rights
in intellectual property, so that such property will be more readily marketable.
See id.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
10. See Borge Varma, Study No. 13: Works Made for Hire and on Commis-
sion, in SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 123, 139
(Comm. Print 1960).
11. See Matthew R. Harris, Copyright, Computer Software, and Work Made
for Hire, 89 MICH. L. REv. 661, 662 (1990).
WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
endeavors. Contract principles assume that people structure consen-
sual transactions to obtain the benefit of any bargains reached. In an
employment context, employees and employers are free to bargain
over such terms as salary, benefits, and creative control over the
work. Where an employer makes certain promises but fails to fulfill
them, it should no longer be entitled to the copyright it owns by vir-
tue of the presumption. 12 This Comment proposes that where an em-
ployer breaches an express or implied agreement with its employee,
the employee should be entitled to rescind the contract and thereby
recapture the copyright. 13 The scope of this remedy should be, how-
ever, limited to situations where the employment relates primarily to
creative activities--employees who design poster art or album covers
for their employers, filmmakers, and other employees whose primary
job function depends on their creative abilities and talent. Where
creativity by the employee is only an incidental part of the employ-
ment relationship, but still within the scope of employment, the ade-
quacy of legal remedies provided by contract law cannot justify di-
vestiture of the copyright from the party initiating the creative
process and bearing the commercial risk of its success.
Part I of this Comment discusses copyright ownership, author-
ship as an economic concept, the implications of finding a work to be
a work made for hire, and how to determine whether a work is made
for hire under the Copyright Act. Part II summarizes remedies avail-
able under the Copyright Act and legal remedies available for breach
of contract, and illustrates why such remedies are inadequate to
compensate a creative employee for loss of a copyright when there is
a material breach of an employment agreement by its employer. Part
12. An employer's failure to pay compensation to its employee is a material
breach of the employment agreement which should entitle the employee to the
remedy of rescission. See Black v. Pizza Time Theatres, 1983 Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) 25,569 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Hughey v. Palographics Co., 189
U.S.P.Q. 527 (D. Colo. 1976). Other reasons an employer should be forced to
forfeit copyright ownership include fraudulently inducing an employee into
making an unfair agreement or breaching a promise to allow its employee to
maintain creative control or direction over the work. See Trenton v. Infinity
Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416 (C.D. Cal. 1994); McKinney v. Gannett Co.,
660 F. Supp. 984 (D.N.M. 1981), affd, 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987); Brown
v. Cosby, 433 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
13. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 5.03(E) (1996) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
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III analyzes why an employer should forfeit initial ownership of a
copyright and how an employee may bring a claim for rescission to
recapture that copyright. Part IV concludes that creative employees
should, in limited situations, be entitled to rescind contracts of em-
ployment and recapture copyrights in works made for hire.
I. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
A. Authorship as an Economic Concept: Works Made for Hire
In order to further the underlying goals of copyright, 14 the Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to secure to authors the exclusive rights
to their works for a limited time. i5 As a general rule, the party who
actually creates the work by translating the idea into a fixed, tangible
expression, is the owner, or "author," and is thus entitled to copyright
protection. 16 The text of the Constitution thus reserves initial owner-
ship of the copyright to the initial creator.
In contrast to the intellectual characterization of authorship pre-
viously described, the "work made for hire" doctrine is an economic
conceptualization of authorship. The work made for hire doctrine
confers initial ownership upon the person or entity who finances the
work's creation and dissemination. The hiring party's assumption of
all of the economic risks entitles it to be treated as "author."'
17
14. Copyright law seeks to balance the need to motivate artistic and original
creation of works by allowing commercial exploitation by the creator and the
need to benefit the general public through knowledge gained by access to such
works. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (stating that although the immediate effect of copyright law is "to se-
cure a fair return for an author's creative labor.... the ultimate aim [of copy-
right law] is... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general good").
15. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989).
17. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 327 (1989) (discussing the
economic costs of producing copyrightable works).
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B. The Work Made for Hire Doctrine as Defined by the United
I States Copyright Act
The Copyright Act defines a "work made for hire" as: (1) a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment, or (2) specially commissioned works where the parties ex-
pressly agree in a written and signed instrument indicating their in-
tent to consider the work to be made for hire. 18 Rather than vesting
ownership in the actual author of the creative work, the Act vests
ownership of works made for hire in the employer or party for whom
the work is prepared. The employer is then considered the author for
purposes of the statute. 19 This is true unless the parties- expressly
agree otherwise in a signed written instrument.
20
C. The Benefits of Ownership and the Implications of Finding a
Work to be Made for Hire
Classifying a work as "made for hire" carries profound signifi-
cance for creative employees 21 and the industries which employ
them.22 Whether a work is made for hire determines the initial own-
ership of a work's copyright, the copyright's duration,23 the owner's
renewal rights,2 4 termination rights, and the right to import certain
goods bearing on the copyright.26 Works created before January 1,
1978, and works created on or after January 1, 1978, are subject to a
varying term of protection depending on whether the work was
originally created in a for hire relationship.27 Works in which a
statutory copyright was subsisting prior to the effective date of the
18. A work must fall within one of the nine categories enumerated in the
statute: contribution to a collective work, motion pictures or other audio visual
works, translations, supplementary works, compilations, instructional texts,
tests, answer materials for a test, or an atlas. See 17 U.S.C. § 10 1(2) (1994).
19. See id. § 201(b).
20. See id.
21. Although the list is not exhaustive, creative employees include artists,
writers, photographers, designers, composers and computer programmers.
22. Such industries include publishing, motion pictures, television produc-
tion, advertising and music.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994).
24. See id. § 304(a).
25. See id. § 203(a).
26. See id. § 601(b).
27. See id. §§ 302(c), 303.
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Copyright Act-January 1, 1978-are subject to renewal of that
copyright after the initial 28-year term.28 The person entitled to
claim such renewal varies, depending on whether or not the work is
one made for hire.
29
Authorship and copyright protection under initial ownership or a
renewal term entitles the owner to exclusive commercial exploitation
of the work. The owner has the sole right to reproduce the copy-
righted work, to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted
work, and to distribute copies.30 Furthermore, copyright ownership
exclusively entitles the owner to perform or display the work in pub-
lic and to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of digital
audio transmission.
3 1
Works made for hire are not protected under the 1990 amend-
ment to the Copyright Act, the Visual Artists Right Act (VARA). 2
In passing VARA, Congress for the first time provided protection of
an artist's "moral rights" in a work of visual art under the Copyright
Act.33 Moral rights afford protection for the author's personal, non-
economic interests in receiving attribution for her work.34 VARA
defines "works of visual art" to include paintings, drawings, prints
and sculptures, existing in a single copy or in limited edition.
35
Works made for hire are excluded from VARA's definition of works
of visual art and are thus not protected under the amendment.
3 6
28. See id. § 304(a).
29. See id.
30. See id. § 106.
31. See id.
32. See id. § 106A.
33. See id.; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commen-
tary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477,478 (1990).
34. See id.
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
36. See id.; Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), affid in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d
Cir. 1995). For a further discussion of the moral rights issue in copyright, see
Collen Creamer Fielkow, Clashing Rights Under United States Copyright
Law: Harmonizing an Employer's Right with the Artist-Employee's Moral
Rights in a Work Made for Hire, 7 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 218 (1997); Russ
VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Arts: Contract Theory and Analy-
sis, 67 WASH. L. REV. 827 (1992); Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture
Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv.
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D. How to Determine Under Copyright Law Whether a Creator Is
an Independent Contractor or Employee
In determining whether a work is made for hire, a court must
first determine whether the creator is an employee or an independent
contractor. 37 If the creator is deemed to be an independent contrac-
tor, his or her work will be made for hire if the work falls within a
number of categories and there is a written agreement expressing that
the commissioning party owns the work. These specially ordered or
commissioned works include an atlas; works to be used as a contri-
bution to a collective work, motion picture or other audiovisual
work; or works to be used as a translation, supplementary work,
compilation, instructional text, test, or answer material for a test.38 if
the work falls within one of these categories and there is a written
agreement expressing that the work is made for hire, the commis-
sioning party owns the work. If the work either does not fall within
one of the categories or there is no written and signed agreement
between the parties, then the creator, as an independent contractor,
retains copyright ownership. On the other hand, if the creator is
deemed to be an employee and there is no writing to the contrary, the
employer owns the copyright.39
The Supreme Court set forth factors relevant in determining
whether a creator is an independent contractor or employee in Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.4 0 The case involved a
sculpture created by James Earl Reid, a Baltimore, Maryland artist.
41
In the fall of 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV), a non-profit unincorporated association dedicated to elimi-
nating homelessness, decided to sponsor a display dramatizing the
plight of the homeless in conjunction with the annual Christmastime
Pageant of Peace in Washington, D.C.42 CCNV contacted Reid to
628 (1989).
37. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738
(1989).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1994).
39. See id. § 201(b).
40. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
41. See id. at 733.
42. See id.
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create a sculpture of a homeless family eventually entitled "Third
World America."
43
Since the sculpture did not fall within one of the nine categories
enumerated in § 101(2)44 and the parties did not execute an assign-
ment or other written agreement, the dispute centered around
whether Reid, the artist, was an employee acting within the scope of
his employment, or whether he was an independent contractor.
45
Status as an employee meant that the sculpture belonged to CCNV,
while status as an independent contractor meant that Reid owned the
copyright in his work.46
The district court found that because CCNV was the motivating
force behind the sculpture, that "Third World America" was a work
made for hire.4 7 The court also found that CCNV had "'directed
enough of [Reid's] effort to assure that.., he had produced what
they, not he, wanted.' 48 Accordingly, the district court determined
that CCNV owned the copyright.49
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed.50 The court held that Reid owned the copyright because un-
der agency law, Reid was an independent contractor.51 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed.52 In rejecting
the district court's reliance on CCNV's right to control, or actual
control over, Reid's work,53 the Court considered four possible tests:




44. See id. at 736. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text (listing
the nine categories enumerated in § 101(2)).
45. See 490 U.S. at 738.
46. See id. at 737.
47. See id. at 735.
48. See id. at 735-36.
49. See id. at 735.
50. See id. at 736.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 741, 750.
54. See id. at 738, 741-42; Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828,
829 (D. Colo. 1985); Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
55. See 490 U.S. at 739, 742; Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas
Publ'g Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys.
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The Court rejected CCNV's claims of copyright based on both
the right to control and actual control tests.58 The right to control test
refers to the right to direct and control the means and manner of
creation. 59 Under this test, a creator is considered an employee as
long as the employer retains the right to control the creation of the
work, regardless of whether the employer actually exercises the con-
trol. The Court rejected this test because its exclusive focus "on the
relationship between the hiring party and the product clashes with the
language of § 101(1), which focuses on the relationship between the
hired and hiring parties." 60 The Court further noted:
Section 101 plainly creates two distinct ways in which a
work can be deemed for hire: one for works prepared by
employees, the other for those specially ordered or commis-
sioned works which fall within one of the nine enumerated
categories and are the subject of a written agreement. The
right to control the product test ignores this dichotomy by
transforming into a work for hire under §101(1) any "spe-
cially ordered or commissioned" work that is subject to the
supervision and control of the hiring party. Because a party
who hires a "specially ordered or commissioned" work by
definition has a right to specify the characteristics of the
product desired . . . the right to control the product test
would mean that many works that could satisfy §101(2)
would already have been deemed works for hire under
§101(l).61
The Court rejected the actual control test based on similar ra-
tionale: "Under the actual control test, a work for hire could arise
under §101(2), but not under §101(1), where a party commissions,
but does not actually control, a product which falls into one of the
Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
56. See 490 U.S. at 739, 742-43 n.8; Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1989).
57. See 490 U.S. at 739-43.
58. See id. at 741-43.
59. See Harris, supra note 11, at 676.
60. 490 U.S. at 741.
61. Id.
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nine enumerated categories." 62 Because § 101 only distinguished
between works prepared by an employee and commissioned works,
the Court found "no statutory support for an additional dichotomy
between commissioned works that are actually controlled and super-
vised by the hiring party and those that are not."
63
The formal salaried employee test adopts the narrowest defini-
tion of the term "employee." Only creators qualifying as employees
in the traditional sense of being paid a regular wage and having taxes
withheld could be found to be employees. 64 The Court did not elabo-
rate on reasons why this was an unacceptable test.
Ultimately, the Court adopted the common law agency test
based on "past cases of statutory interpretation" where terms such as
"employee," "employer," and "scope of employment," were under-
stood in light of agency law.65 Since the Act used the term "scope of
employment," the Court found that there was congressional intent to
incorporate the agency law definition.
66
After determining that Congress had intended the "agency"
definition of the term "employee" to apply in interpreting the work
made for hire provision, the Court analyzed the relationship between
Reid and CCNV in light of several factors. The factors included: (1)
the source and location of Reid's work and its tools, (2) the skill re-
quired, (3) the duration of the relationship between Reid and CCNV,
(4) whether CCNV had the right to assign additional projects to Reid,
(5) the extent of Reid's discretion over when and how long to work,
and (6) whether the sculpture was part of CCNV's regular business.
67
The Court also considered how Reid was paid, whether he received
employment benefits, his role in hiring and paying assistants, and
whether CCNV paid Social Security taxes.68
Although the Supreme Court found that CCNV exercised some
control over the manner and means by which "Third World
62. Id. at 742.
63. Id.
64. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1101-04 (rejecting the actual and right to con-
trol tests as inconsistent with both the plain language of the statute and con-
gressional intent).
65. See 490 U.S. at 740.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 751-52.
68. See id.
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America" was created, it concluded that most of the factors weighed
heavily against finding an employment relationship between Reid
and CCNV:
Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied his
own tools. He worked in his own studio in Baltimore
making daily supervision of his activities from Washington
[by CCNV] practically impossible. Reid was retained for
... a relatively short period of time. During and after this
time, CCNV had no right to assign additional projects to
Reid. Apart from the deadline for completing the sculpture,
Reid had absolute freedom to decide when and how long to
work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum dependent on
"completion of a specific job, a method by which independ-
ent contractors are often compensated." Reid had total dis-
cretion in hiring and paying assistants.
69
The Court also found that Reid was an independent contractor
because CCNV was not a business and creating sculptures could not
have therefore been part of its regular business.70 Finally, the Court
found that CCNV did not pay payroll or taxes, provide any employ-
ment benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers'
compensation funds.
71
Courts after CCNV typically agree that no one factor is disposi-
tive in determining whether a hired party is an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor. 72 Some factors will be more relevant than others
in any given situation, while others will have no relevance at all.73
Although relevant factors should be tallied and considered in light of
their relative importance, 74 the hiring party's right to control the
means of creation, the skill required of the work, the tax treatment of
the hired party, the provision of employee benefits, and whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party, are significant factors in "virtually every situation."
75
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. See id. at 753.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
73. See, e.g., Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1549 (3d Cir.
1992) (declining to apply factors it deemed to be "indeterminate").
74. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
75. Id.; Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y.
January 19991
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II. THE INADEQUACY OF COPYRIGHT REMEDIES AND LEGAL
REMEDIES UNDER CONTRACT LAW
A. Only "Owners" Have Remedies Under the Copyright Act
Copyright infringement occurs when anyone violates any one of
the exclusive rights 7of the copyright owner or author.77 An act of
infringement also occurs when copies are imported into the United
States in violation of section 602 of the Copyright Act.78 Once an act
of infringement occurs, the owner of the copyright has certain reme-
dies under the Copyright Act.79 Only the legal or beneficial owner of
the copyright may initiate an action against an alleged infringer.
80
Under the work for hire doctrine, the employer rather than its
employee is deemed the copyright owner.81 Therefore, if a copyright
is infringed, it is the employer who is entitled to bring an action for
damages or equity. An employee is not entitled to bring an action for
any of the remedies available for an action of infringement, unless or
until the employee can prove that he or she owns the copyright.
1994), affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
76. See supra Part I.C.
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
78. See id.
79. See id. §§ 502-505. Remedies for copyright infringement include an
injunction to prevent or restrain infringement of the copyright. See id. § 502.
A court may also order the impounding of copies of articles which are alleg-
edly being infringed. See id. § 503. An owner bringing a copyright infringe-
ment action may also recover legal damages. The Copyright Act allows the
owner to elect between actual damages and profits or statutory damages. See
id. § 504(b)-(c).
80. See id. § 501(b) ("The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right
under a copyright is entitled.., to institute an action for any infringement of
that particular right committed while he or she is owner of it."). A beneficial
owner has been defined as including "an author who.. .part[s] with legal title
to the copyright in exchange for a percentage of the royalties based on sales or
license fees." Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5775). A beneficial owner may bring an infringement action to protect his or
her economic interest in the copyright from being diluted by a wrongdoer's in-
fringement. See id. A beneficial owner thus only has an economic, rather than
an ownership, interest in the copyright. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F.
Supp. 1129,1131 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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B. Legal Damages Are Inadequate to Compensate an Employee for
Loss of a Copyright
The purpose of contract damages is to give compensation for a
breach, so far as money can do this.82 In most cases, the plaintiff's
measure of damages will be based on "expectation," or an amount of
money sufficient to enable the plaintiff to purchase a substitute per-
formance.83 In an employment context, contract damages usually
consist of lost salary and benefits.84 However, these damages are in-
adequate to compensate an employee for loss of a copyright for at
least three reasons. First, claims typically brought for breach of em-
ployment agreements, namely wrongful termination claims, are ir-
relevant in a dispute over copyright ownership. Second, damages for
the potential value of a copyright cannot be ascertained with any de-
gree of certainty. Third, copyrights are a unique form of property the
loss of which may only be adequately compensated for by equitable
remedies.
85
Breach of contract actions by an employee against its employer
typically involve claims of wrongful termination in violation of sub-
stantial public policy,86 discharge in breach of the implied covenant
82. See 5 LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964) [hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS] (stating
that courts "must determine what additions to an injured party's wealth (ex-
pected gains) have been prevented by the breach and what subtractions from
his wealth (losses) have been caused by it").
83. See 4 LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 958 (1998 Supp.) [hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
SUPP.]; Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (Winter, J., sep. op.) ("[T]he measure of damages is the loss of com-
pensation [that] would have been paid had [the employee] been permitted to
perform .. . less what [the employee] actually earned or reasonably would
have earned in the time [the employee] was not required to perform [the] con-
tract.").
84. See MAUREEN E. MCCLAIN, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION LAW: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 51 (C.E.B. 1995).
85. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
86. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 610 P.2d
1330, 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 (1980) (holding that an employer's
authority over its employee includes neither the right to demand that its em-
ployee commit a criminal act to further its interests nor the right to coerce
compliance with unlawful directions by discharging an employee who refuses
to follow such orders); Sheet's v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 387
(Conn. 1980); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Free-
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of good faith and fair dealing,87 or discharge in breach of an implied
promise not to terminate without good cause.88 These causes of ac-
tion for wrongful termination will not apply in a loss of copyright
scenario where the employee has not been terminated. A creative
employee is injured not by virtue of termination but because an em-
ployer owns the copyrights in his or her works while failing to fulfill
its own obligations under the employment agreement. Even assum-
ing one of these causes of action applied, the employee is suing on
the contract, affirming its existence in order to recover damages
thereon. In breach of contract or implied covenant cases, contract
damages alone are available.89 A court may allow recovery of tort
damages if the employee can show that the termination was in viola-
tion of some substantial public policy.90 Because an employee in
most cases will only be able to recover damages as measured by the
terms of the employment agreement, and a copyright's value is po-
tentially greater, contract damages are usually inadequate.
Money damages are also inadequate to remedy a creative em-
ployee for loss of a copyright because damages cannot be ascertained
doms: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404 (1967); Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Em-
ployee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L.
REv. 279, 307-18 (1971). Wrongful termination in violation of public policy
is designed to protect a terminated employee who is discharged because of a
refusal to participate in an illegal act. See Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1321-22 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
87. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an im-
plied promise by both parties to the contract not to do anything in bad faith that
would deprive the other party of the contract's benefits. See Habetz v. Con-
don, 618 A.2d 501, 505 (Conn. 1992).
88. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 681-82, 765 P.2d at 387-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
218; Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); MCCLAIN, supra note 84, at 51. See also infra notes 184-86 and ac-
companying text (discussing the implied promise not to terminate without
good cause as an exception to the at-will employment rule).
89. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699, 765 P.2d at 400, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
90. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
874 (1992) (awarding contract and tort damages of $1,340,000 to an insurance
company sales manager allegedly forced to resign for complaining of sexual
harassment of a co-worker and refusing to withhold information or testify
falsely in connection with the administrative investigation of the co-worker's
claim).
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with any reasonable degree of certainty. 91 Damages fail to address
the time and effort an employee puts into creating a particular work
and its potential financial value. Damages cannot address how em-
ployees may feel when they no longer have creative direction over
their work, especially where the employee specifically contracts for
this term.92 What the employee is losing-the personal, aesthetic,
and financial value of his or her intellectual endeavors-cannot be
measured by the loss of salary or benefits. One could not measure
and therefore adequately compensate an employee for the potential
value of his or her intellectual property. Lastly, like trademarks and
other forms of intellectual property, a copyright is a unique form of
property, the loss of which may only be adequately compensated for
by equitable remedies.
93
C. Equitable Remedies Other Than Rescission of Contract Are
Insufficient to Compensate an Employee for Loss of Copyright
Ownership
1. Restitution without rescission will not re-vest copyright
ownership in the employee
Generally, a party who has substantially performed a contractual
obligation may recover a money amount equal to the reason-
able value of the services already performed.94  Under this
91. Cf Tamarind Lithography Workshop, Inc. v. Sanders, 143 Cal. App. 3d
571, 576-77, 193 Cal. Rptr. 409, 413 (1983) (holding that an award of damages
was an inadequate remedy at law in lieu of specific performance for breach of
an agreement to give a filmmaker screen credits). The court in Tamarind
found that "future" damages resulting from loss of screen credit were too
"ethereal to define in terms of a monetary reward." Id. at 576, 193 Cal. Rptr.
at 412.
92. See McKinney v. Gannett Co., 660 F. Supp. 984, 1014 (D.N.M. 1981),
affid, 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
93. See Cassidy v. Bowlin, 540 F. Supp. 901, 904 (W.D. Mo. 1982). In
granting a preliminary injunction in favor a successful and respected wildlife
photographer and lithograph producer who had "taken care to build his reputa-
tion," the court found that the defendant's copyright infringement had auto-
matically divested the photographer of the exclusive control over his unique
intellectual property. See also Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publ., Inc., 315
A.2d 577 (Del. 1974) (viewing a prayer for an assignment of a copyright to its
owner as a genuine effort to secure a unique property).
94. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS SUPP., supra note 83, §§ 1104, 1109;
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"quasi-contractual" theory of recovery, a plaintiff, who is prevented
from completing the purpose or undertaking intended by a contract,
may sue for and recover the value of his or her services. 5 An action
for restitution is not based on a rescinded contract but on an implied
promise of compensation. 96 An employee can recover such "dam-
ages," or quantum meruit, even where there is no written contract.
97
A plaintiff may also recover under restitution where the defendant
has been discharged from its duty under an existing contract and thus
not liable for any breach.98 In order to make a claim for restitution, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) the performance of services in good
faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they
were rendered, (3) the expectation of compensation for the services
rendered, and (4) the reasonable value of the service.
99
Assuming an employee can plead and prove the elements enu-
merated above, he or she may be entitled to recover an amount of
money which exceeds the price contracted for by the parties.
00
However, the contract price remains "competent evidence" of the
reasonable value of the employee's services. 1 1 Furthermore, resti-
tution only considers the value of an employee's services. Thus, an
employee, who has forfeited a copyright and all of the attached ex-
clusive rights to commercial exploitation under a work made for hire
arrangement, receives only some benefit in suing for restitution.
Beaudoin v. Zaccardo, 371 A.2d 1174, 1175 (N.H. 1977).
95. See Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 304, 273 P.2d 15, 19 (1954).
96. See 3 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS OF
CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 705 (2d ed. 1929) [hereinafter
BLACK ON RESCISSION].
97. See Abramson v. Delrose, 132 F. Supp. 440, 444 (D. Del. 1955) (al-
lowing an architect to maintain a suit for the reasonable value of his services
after he had performed a majority of the work and after the defendant aban-
doned the undertaking, even though there was no written agreement between
the parties).
98. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS SuPP., supra note 83, § 1104.
99. See Mauro v. Orville, 660 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (citation omit-
ted).
100. An employee may recover an amount greater than the contract price
unless the contract has been fully performed. See Oliver, 43 Cal. 2d at 303,
273 P.2d at 18.
101. See id. at 305, 273 P.2d at 19.
WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
On the other hand, an employee could elect both rescission and
restitution. 0 2 Combined, these remedies entitle the employee to re-
capture the copyright while at the same time recover for the reason-
able value of his or her services. Because rescission renders a con-
tract void, an employee cannot sue to recover damages for a breach
thereon. 10 3 On the other hand, rescission of an employment agree-
ment will enable a creative employee who has invested time, interest,
and effort into creating a work to recapture the copyright. 10 4 Owner-
ship then entitles the employee to benefit from his or her intellectual
endeavors. Restitution ensures that the employee will not be re-
quired to "restore," or repay, any compensation that was due to him
or her under the contract.105
2. A court may not order the specific performance of personal
services contracts
A court will not generally order the specific performance of an
employment or personal services contract, regardless of which party
seeks enforcement. 10 6 The rule prohibiting specific performance of
an employment agreement first developed when courts recognized
the inherent difficulties they would encounter in supervising the per-
formance of uniquely personal efforts. 0 7 An order of specific per-
formance most likely imposes upon courts the difficult job of
passing judgment on the quality of an employee's or employer's
102. See 3 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 561 (noting that "[e]ven
where rescission is the remedy elected, it does not follow that there can be no
compensation in damages"). Because rescission is an equitable remedy, a
court will allow rescission as well as damages if both are necessary to "com-
plete justice." See id.
103. 3 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 561 (noting that after rescis-
sion, no action can lie in breach).
104. 3 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 701 ("[w]hen a contract for
the sale of either real or personal property is rescinded, the title to the subject-
matter of the contract revests in the grantor").
105. See Oliver 43 Cal. 2d at 306, 273 P.2d at 20; 3 BLACK ON RESCISSION,
supra note 96, §§ 616, 621, 704.
106. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3390 (West 1997); Bamdt v. County of Los An-
geles, 211 Cal. App. 3d 397, 403-04, 259 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376-77 (1989).
107. See Barndt, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 376. Corbin also
notes in his treatise that "[a]n artist does not work well under compulsion, and
the court might find it difficult to pass judgment upon the performance ren-
dered." 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 82, § 1204.
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performance. 10 8 The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against
involuntary servitude also provides a compelling reason for courts to
avoid directing the performance of personal services. 0 9 In an even
more tangible sense, the common law disfavors specific performance
of personal services agreements to avoid the friction and social costs
that often result when an employer and employee are reunited in a
relationship that has already failed. 110 This rationale is particularly
applicable where the employment relationship requires mutual confi-
dence among the parties and involves the exercise of discretionary
authority."' Since a court will not order the specific performance of
an employment agreement, this equitable remedy, potentially avail-
able in other types of breach of contract claims, is not available to a
creative employee suing his or her employer for breach of the em-
ployment agreement.
III. FORFEITURE OF INITIAL COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP BY EMPLOYERS
A. Forfeiture of Copyright Ownership
Section 201(b) creates a presumption of copyright ownership in
an employer or commissioning party. The Copyright Act does not,
however, preclude an employer and its employee from agreeing that
the copyright shall remain with the employee. Evidence of a written
agreement indicating that the employee is to retain copyright owner-
ship in the work, for example, easily rebuts this presumption. Be-
cause nothing in the Copyright Act indicates that an employer neces-
sarily remains owner of the copyright, evidence of a material breach
of the employment agreement by the employer may also sufficiently
rebut the presumption of ownership. 12 The theory that a copyright
108. See Motown Record Corp. v. Brockert, 160 Cal. App. 3d 123, 137, 207
Cal. Rptr. 574, 583 (1984).
109. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 1144, 224 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261
(1986).
110. See Poultry Producers v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 288-89, 208 P. 93, 97
(1922); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 367 cmt. a (1981).
111. See Poultry Producers, 189 Cal. at 288, 208 P. at 97.
112. See 1 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 5.03(E); Black v. Pizza
Time Theatres, 1983 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 25,569 (N.D. Cal. 1983);
Hughey v. Palographics Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. 527 (D. Colo. 1976).
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should revert to an employee in light of a material breach by its em-
ployer stems from the notion that one should not be entitled to
something for which one did not pay.113
An employee may sufficiently state a claim of copyright owner-
ship in works made for hire by focusing on the fact that an employer
failed to pay him or her for the contracted services. 1 14 The presump-
tion in the Copyright Act suggests that it is not merely the em-
ployer's status as an employer, but the employment agreement itself,
which makes that employer the author.115 Since the employer would
not be the author at all if the parties had expressly agreed otherwise,
it is the employment agreement itself which gives an employer the
rights of authorship by virtue of the implied agreement under
§ 20 1(b). 116 The employer's material breach of the employment
contract thus gives rise to a claim of rescission of contract, including
the implied right to authorship."17
B. Recapturing Copyrights in Works Made for Hire
1. Threshold issues
In bringing a claim for rescission of contract, an employee will
have to consider threshold issues such as the relevant statutes of
limitations governing written and oral contracts, as well as federal
preemption of state-based remedies.
a. statutes of limitations
A claim for breach of contract is not governed by the Copyright
Act. One must turn to state law in order to determine the relevant
statute of limitations in bringing a claim for breach of contract. In
113. See Richardson v. Gilbert, 61 Eng. Rep. 130 (Ch. 1851) (stating that in
a work made for hire situation, actual payment of a work was a necessary con-
dition to the vesting of the copyright therein in the proprietor of such work).
See also Brown v. Cooke, 16 L.J.Q.B. 140, 143 (Ch. 1846) (alluding to the
idea that a copyright in a work will belong to the proprietor of such work only
when the proprietor pays his employee upon the terms of their agreement).
114. See Black v. Pizza Time Theatres, 1983 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
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California, a claim for breach of a written contract must be brought
within four years."11 Claims for breach of an oral contract must be
brought within two years.'" 9 A creative employee must strictly ad-
here to the relevant statutes of limitations in order to succeed in
bringing a claim for rescission of contract and copyright ownership.
Brown v. Cosby120 involved copyrights in characters eventually
appearing in Bill Cosby's "Fat Albert Show." In 1970, Cosby con-
tacted his childhood friend, Kenneth Brown, and asked him to create
cartoon characters of their mutual childhood friends whom Cosby
had adapted into a comedy routine.12' Over the next several months
Brown developed characters on paper and received $250 per week
from Cosby's company, Jemmin.122 Eventually, Brown entered into
a written agreement with Cosby and Jemmin. The agreement pro-
vided that Brown was to be employed as an independent contractor
to produce comic strips based on the characters. 123 The agreement
also contained a work made for hire provision which expressly stated
that Jemmin was to:
exclusively own, in addition to [Brown's] services, all of
the results and proceeds thereof as though [Brown] were
[defendant's] employee-for-hire, including but not limited
to all rights throughout the world of copyright, trademark,
patent, production, manufacture, recordation, reproduction,
transcription, performance and exhibition by any medium
now known or hereafter discovered and to obtain renewals
thereof.
124
About the same time the parties entered into the written letter
agreement, Lou Schimer and Norm Prescott, two principals of
118. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 337(1) (West 1982).
119. See id. § 339(1) (West Supp. 1998).
120. 433 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
121. See id. at 1334.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1334-35. It seems unlikely that someone would willingly assign
such a broad grant of rights for nothing more than independent contractor
status and such a modest salary. Employees usually forfeit their rights in the
copyright of a work to which they might otherwise be entitled, in exchange for
employee benefits and other security. See supra note 7 and accompanying
text. In this case, Brown forfeited both these benefits and his copyright.
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Filmation Associates (Filmation), along with Cosby, made to Brown
an oral promise that they would pay to Brown twenty-five percent of
the profits generated from any other commercial exploitation of the
characters, and that Filmation would retain Brown as a consultant.
125
Commercial exploitation of Brown's characters, in the form of
books, films and novelty items, eventually resulted in "very substan-
tial profits" for the defendants.
26
Jemmin initially paid $6,500 to Brown for his services but did
not pay Brown any profits. 127 Filmation did not hire Brown as a con-
sultant.' 28 At some later point, Jemmin attempted to have Brown
sign a second letter of agreement which would have in effect termi-
nated the first letter agreement and provided Brown with a final
payment of $1,600. The letter also stated that Brown was not enti-
tled to any other compensation under the previous agreement and
that "Jemmin was the owner of all 'results and proceeds' of
[Brown's] services rendered under the [first letter] agreement."'
129
Although Brown refused to sign the second letter agreement, Cosby
and Jemmin had already commercially exploited the characters and
substantially destroyed their value to Brown.'
30
Brown's primary claim against Cosby, Jemmin, Filmation, and
Filmation's principals was for breach of contract. 13  The statute of
limitations in bringing the claim begins to accrue at the time of the
breach.'32 The court found that the breach accrued on or arbund June
27, 1971, when Jemmin sent the proposed termination letter to
Brown, when it stopped making payments to Brown under the writ-
ten agreement, or when Filmation failed to hire him as a consultant
or pay him profits under the terms of the oral agreement. 133 The
125. See Brown, 433 F. Supp. at 1335.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1340.
128. See id. at 1336.
129. Id. at 1335.
130. See id. at 1341. Once Jemmin appropriated Brown's characters for use
in the television series, Brown was "unable to sell them as characters with dif-
ferent names and personalities." Id. The defendant's use of Brown's characters
rendered the characters valueless to him since such exploitation effectively
precluded Brown from marketing them himself.
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court applied the California limitations period to Brown's claims be-
cause the defendants-Cosby, Filmation, Schimer, and Prescott-
were located in California, the proposed letter agreement was sent to
Brown in California, and because Brown worked in California.
134
Since Brown failed to bring his suit for breach of written contract
within the four-year statute of limitations period and his suit for
breach of oral contract within the two-year statute of limitations pe-
riod, the court dismissed his claims.1
35
b. federal preemption of state-based claims
Whether an artist or employee may rescind a contract allegedly
forfeiting its copyright to a hiring party is partially contingent upon
whether federal copyright law preempts state contract law. The test
for preemption is whether a plaintiff's claim: (1) asserts a "remedy
expressly granted by the Act," (2) requires construction of the Act, or
(3) at least implicates federal copyright policy.136 Not every case in-
volving federal copyright law "arises under" those laws such that
federal jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
137
Section 301 of the Copyright Act, which governs the preemption of
conflicting state law claims, applies only if two conditions are satis-
fied: (1) the work for which the state law right is asserted comes
within the "subject matter" of copyright law, and (2) the state cause




135. See id. at 1337.
136. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993). For patent, copyright, and trademark
suits, the federal subject matter jurisdiction test of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) is
whether the suit is one "arising under" the federal patent, copyright or trade-
mark laws. The "arising under" language in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) is similar to
"arising under" language in the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, rules governing federal question jurisdiction may
also govern patent, copyright and trademark jurisdiction. See Ted D. Lee &
Ann Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent,
Trademark, or Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 703, 706 (1988).
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1), (3) (1994); Worth v. Universal Pictures,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (C.D. Cal. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908
F. Supp. 640, 656 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996).
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In TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,139 the Second Circuit held that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claim did
not arise under the Copyright Act but instead was a dispute con-
cerning ownership of copyright. 140 There was no allegation that the
defendants had used, or threatened to use, copyrighted materials.
141
Rather than infringement, the sole issue in TB. Harms was who
owned the copyright.142 The plaintiff:
did not even raise what has been the problem presented
when a defendant licensed to use a copyright or a patent on
certain terms is alleged to have forfeited the grant; in such
cases federal jurisdiction is held to exist if the plaintiff has
directed his pleading against the offending use, referring to
the license only by way of anticipatory replication, but not
if he has sued to set the license aside, seeking recovery for
unauthorized use only incidentally or not at all.
143
Since the plaintiff alleged neither copyright infringement nor
sought a remedy under the Copyright Act, and because the cause of
action involved contract interpretation to determine who owned the
copyrights, the court held that federal law did not preempt the plain-
tiff's claim.1
44
However, Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc.145 raised the
much more difficult issue of whether a claim asserting infringement
resulting from a breach of a contract purporting to license or assign a
copyright, arose under the Copyright Act. 146 The underlying action
that gave rise to the appeal was litigation between Harris Schoen-
berg, author of A Mandate for Terror: The United Nations and the
PLO, and Shapolsky Publishers.147  The dispute concerned the
139. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
140. See id. at 827.
141. See id. at 825.
142. See Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 827; see also Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391
F.2d 150, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying state law to a dispute over whether a
copyright license included the right to exploit the work through the medium of
television).
145. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
146. See id. at 931.
147. See id. at 928.
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alleged unauthorized publication of Schoenberg's manuscript.'48
The plaintiff alleged "copyright infringement, breach of contract, and
inducing breach of contract."' 49 Schoenberg asserted that Shapolsky
had breached the contract because it failed to make any royalty pay-
ments or render quarterly royalty statements, both of which were due
under the agreement. 50 Since Shapolsky's actions constituted a
breach of contract, Schoenberg alleged that it no longer had a right to
publish his work.151
The Schoenberg court distinguished TB. Harms.5 2 Unlike the
plaintiff's complaint in TB. Harms, which focused on copyright
ownership, Schoenberg's complaint alleged copyright infringe-
ment. 3 Schoenberg's complaint also sought damages and an in-
junction against future infringements. 5 4 The court found that the
Copyright Act addressed a cause of action for infringement and pro-
vided the same remedies that Shapolsky was seeking under state law.
Since Shapolsky's manuscript fell within the "subject matter" of
copyright law, and because he sought state-based remedies which
were provided for in federal copyright law, the Copyright Act pre-






152. See id. at 931-33.
153. See id. at 931.
154. See id.
155. See id. At least one court has taken the analysis a step further by going
beyond the face of the complaint. See Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F.
Supp. 915, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In Berger, the court looked beyond the com-
plaint to see whether it was really infringement with which the plaintiff was
concerned. Because the plaintiff was actually concerned with whether he
would be able to enjoy his property free from the defendant's contract claims,
his complaint failed to assert a claim "arising under" the Copyright Act. See
id. at 918-19. Compare Berger with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Vestron,
Inc. v. Home Box Office Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1988) (reaffirming
the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule: as long as the complaint
alleges infringement and seeks remedies under the Copyright Act, the contro-
versy arises under federal copyright law). See also Lee & Livingston, supra
note 137, at 705-07 (providing "general rules" for avoiding removal from state
court and preemption of state law). The authors state that "in the absence of
diversity, careful pleading of a state court suit assures state court jurisdiction."
Id. at 707. Accordingly, the complaint "should omit any claim arising from
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A contract-based claim must allege nothing more than breach of
contract to avoid removal to federal court. Any allegations of copy-
right infringement trigger federal preemption. 156 In Trenton v. Infin-
ity Broadcasting Corp.,157 the plaintiff predicated his contract-based
causes of action upon a copyright interest in "Loveline," a radio pro-
gram format he allegedly conceived and developed. 158  Since the
court found that he possessed no such copyright interest for the pro-
gram, his contract-related causes of action lacked a required element
for copyright infringement. 159 In dismissing Trenton's contract-
based causes of action without prejudice, the court noted that Tren-
ton could refile his contract-based claims in state court devoid of any
underlying copyright-related claims in the recorded radio programs:
"[b]y focusing on the alleged breach of contract and avoiding any as-
sertion of a copyright interest in the simultaneously recorded
Loveline programs, these claims can be made to adequately assert
state law causes of action." 160 Although the court's dismissal was
determined by an issue of pleading, it left open the question of
whether Trenton would be able to rescind his employment contract
with Infinity.
16 1
TB. Harms, Schoenberg, and Trenton indicate that claims for
copyright infringement will most likely be preempted by the Copy-
right Act. On the other hand, where the plaintiff asserts claims of
ownership, which hinge on contract interpretation, state law governs
the dispute. 162 The distinction between a claim of infringement and
one of ownership is significant where artists seek to protect their
potential copyright interests from the sometimes inequitable
federal law rights and remedies [since] such claims cause federal question ju-
risdiction." Id. Since preempted state law claims will be either treated as fed-
eral claims or be dismissed, they should be omitted. See id.
156. See Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1425 (C.D.
Cal. 1994).
157. 865 F. Supp. 1416.
158. See id. at 1418.
159. See id. at 1429-30.
160. Id. at 1429.
161. See infra notes 237-64 and accompanying text.
162. Cf Rotardier v. Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919, 921
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that principles of common law and equity determine
a dispute over title to a copyright arising from an alleged breach of contract
where that issue is controlling).
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consequences of the work for hire doctrine by electing the remedy of
rescission under contract law.
163
2. Claims for rescission of contract
Rescission is an equitable remedy under which an injured party
may recover if there is no adequate remedy at law.164 Rescission is
either mutual or unilateral 165 and may be implied from the conduct of
the parties.' 66 Mutual rescission requires the consent on the part of
both parties to abandon the contract. 67 Mutual rescission discharges
both parties from the legal obligations existing under the contract by
a subsequent agreement made before the complete performance of
their agreement. 168 Unilateral rescission by one party requires that
the other party's breach be so substantial as to defeat the object of
the parties in making the contract. 169 A party may also choose to
163. If copyright law, rather than contract law, exclusively governs a dispute
regarding copyright ownership, the employee will likely lose any rights to the
copyright by virtue of the presumption created in § 201(b) of the Copyright
Act. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
164. See McKinney v. Gannett Co., 660 F. Supp. 984, 1013 (D.N.M. 1981)
("[A] court of equity will not order an equitable remedy if the party has an
adequate remedy at law.").
165. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689 (West 1985) (providing for mutual and
unilateral rescission of a contract); 1 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, §§
1, 14. But see Anderson v. Lifeco Services Corp., 881 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (D.
Colo. 1995) (finding that under Colorado law, a contract cannot be rescinded
unilaterally).
166. In order to find an implied rescission, or abandonment of the contract,
"the acts and conduct relied upon must be positive, unequivocal, and inconsis-
tent with the contract." Pennel v. Pond Union Sch. Dist., 29 Cal. App. 3d 832,
838, 105 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821 (1973) (citation omitted). The abandonment of
contract by one party must be "complete and unmistakable." See 2 BLACK ON
RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 532.
167. See 2 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 525 ("To effect a rescis-
sion by subsequent mutual agreement, it is necessary that the contract to re-
scind should receive [the] free . . . consent of both or all the parties to the
original contract."). However, this consent does not have to be consummated
in a written agreement. It may result from any act or course of conduct by the
parties which clearly indicates a mutual understanding that the contract has
been abrogated or terminated. See id. § 528.
168. The right of parties to mutually rescind a contract is based on the prin-
ciple that wherever parties have the power to bind themselves by contract, they
may release themselves therefrom by subsequent contract. Id. § 521.
169. See Lerman v. Joyce Int'l, Inc., 10 F.3d 106, 109 (3d Cir. 1993) (quot-
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invoke the equitable powers of a court and obtain a decree for rescis-
sion of contract. When courts are called upon to set aside contracts,
the party seeking rescission must show that substantial reasons exist
for setting aside the contract. The result of any type of rescission-
mutual, unilateral, or implied-brings the parties to their respective
positions before the agreement between them existed.
170
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright inures to an employer by
virtue of an employment agreement, whether express or implied.
Thus, in order to recapture a copyright, the employee must rescind
the employment agreement. Since the result of such rescission
brings the parties to their respective positions before the agreement
between them existed, the employer and employee no longer have an
agreement, and the copyright reverts to the employee. 171 This rem-
edy is most desirable for an employee who foresees no long-term
benefit in continuing employment with a particular employer. How-
ever, an employee seeking to rescind a contract must do so with
"reasonable promptness." 172 The employee cannot claim relief after
acquiescing in the existing conditions for so long a period of time
that the rescission would seriously compromise an employer's rights
and interests.
173
There are at least two more reasons why a creative employee
seeking to rescind an employment agreement should do so promptly.
First, the value of a copyright lies in its potential for commercial ex-
ploitation. 174 Where an employer has already exploited the copyright
in a particular work, it is of little value to the employee, and there is
little reason to bring an action to recover it. Second, the remedy of
rescission requires a party seeking to rescind a contract to restore the
ing Callanan v. Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 752 (N.Y. 1910)).
170. See Sokol v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 946 S.W.2d 20, 25 n.5
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Ballenger v. Castle Rock Bldg. Corp., 904 S.W.2d
62, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)). While the effect of rescission, generally speak-
ing, is to undo the existing contract and completely restore the parties to the
positions in which they stood immediately before it was made, rescission by
mutual agreement enables the parties to avoid any retroactive effect and sub-
sequent destruction of previously vested rights. See Young v. New Pedrara
Onyx Co., 48 Cal. App. 1, 23, 192 P. 55, 64 (1920).
171. See 1 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, § 5.03(E).
172. 1 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 197.
173. See id.
174. See supra notes 4, 127-30 and accompanying text.
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other party to the position he or she was in before the agreement.
175
Thus, when a creative employee seeks to rescind an employment
agreement in order to recapture a copyright, one might argue that the
employee is required to return to its employer any compensation or
benefits that the employee received as consideration for the contract.
The longer the employee delays in rescinding the contract, the more
compensation he or she will have to return. However, the employee
will most likely fall into one of the exceptions to the "restoration"
requirement. A party seeking rescission of a contract will not be re-
quired to restore the other party to its previous position if the contract
is one for personal services, 176 or where the rescission was effected
by mutual agreement.
177
In order to be allowed to elect the remedy of rescission, an in-
jured party must show that there is an enforceable contract, 178 that it
was materially breached, 179 and that there is no adequate remedy at
law. 180 Contracts are frequently described as express or implied.
18 1
175. See 3 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, §§ 616-617.
176. An employee will not be required to return any compensation that was
paid to him or her under the contract which he or she would have been entitled
to retain "in any event." Id. § 621. See also supra notes 92-103 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that an employee can avoid having to restore to an em-
ployer any compensation that has already been paid under the employment
agreement by bringing a suit for restitution).
177. See 3 BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 704.
178. Rescission is only applicable to the undoing of something which has
been the subject of mutual agreement. It is thus restricted to the cancellation of
contracts involving mutual obligations. Therefore, before there can be any "re-
scission," there must be a completely formed and enforceable contract between
the parties. See I BLACK ON RESCISSION, supra note 96, § 3. As enforceable
contracts, oral and implied agreements are subject to rescission. See Brown v.
National Elec. Works, 168 Cal. 336, 338, 143 P. 606, 606-07 (1914) (breaches
of an implied contract to employ the plaintiff for a reasonable time entitled the
plaintiff to rescission); cf Oliker v. Gershunoff, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1288, 1294-
95, 241 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418-19 (1987) (finding that the defendants were not
entitled to rescission of an oral partnership agreement based on the court's
finding that the plaintiff discharged his burden of rebutting the presumption of
alleged undue influence).
179. See Lerman v. Joyce Int'l, Inc., 10 F.3d at 109; Hensley v. E.R. Car-
penter Co., 633 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (5th Cir. 1980); Pasquel v. Owen, 186
F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1950); Anderson v. Lifeco Servs. Corp., 881 F. Supp.
at 1504.
180. See McKinney v. Gannett Co., 660 F. Supp. at 1013. See also supra
Part II.B (discussing the inadequacy of legal damages in compensating an em-
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An express contract is formed by oral or written language.182 Im-
plied contracts are formed by conduct or manifestations of assent
other than oral or written language.
183
In an employment context, when there is no contract stating a
definite term or length of employment and no statutory restrictions
on termination apply, the employment relationship is "at-will."
184
The concept that, just as an employee can voluntarily quit at any
time, so can the employer terminate the employee for any reason.
Whether an employee is at-will depends upon the totality of the cir-
cumstances of the employment relationship. For example, an im-
plied contract not to terminate without good cause may arise when
the employee can reasonably assume, from indirect statements, past
practices, personnel policies, longevity of employment, and other
factors in the workplace, that they are not employed at-will. 185 In
such an event, the employee is no longer at-will and may bring a
claim for breach of contract.'8 6 Thus creative employees may show
ployee for loss of copyright ownership for an employer's breach of the em-
ployment agreement).
181. See Bullock v. Automobile Club of Mich., 444 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Mich.
1989) (formation of an employment contract may be either "by express agree-
ment, oral or written, or as a result of an employee's legitimate expectations
grounded in an employer's policy statements") (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)).
182. See Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P.2d 310, 314 (Alaska 1989)
("[F]ormation of an express contract requires an offer encompassing its essen-
tial terms, an unequivocal acceptance of the terms by the offeree, consideration
and an intent to be bound.").
183. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 925-26 (1981) (noting that courts may consider "the personnel poli-
cies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions
or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued em-
ployment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is en-
gaged").
184. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 482
(1976).
185. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
186. The implied-in-fact contract claim acts as a limitation on an employer's
historical at-will power to terminate one of its employees. See General Dy-
namics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 1177, 876 P.2d 487, 495, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 9 (1994).
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the existence of an employment contract if there is any written, oral,
or implied agreement with an employer.
A party's failure to perform in accordance with the contractual
terms will amount to a material breach if the other party does not re-
ceive the substantial benefit of the bargain struck between them.
187
A material breach entitles the injured party to certain remedies such
as damages, restitution, or rescission. An employee may thus be en-
titled to rescind a contract where the employer fails to perform sub-
stantially or materially breaches the contract and the breach goes to
the essence of the bargain.
188
Compensation for one's services is a term material to any em-
ployment contract. Most employees would not work for a particular
employer unless they received compensation for such services. An
employer's right to authorship in a work made for hire is contingent
upon such payment for the employee's work. In Hughey v. Pa-
lographics Co.,'89 the defendant, Palographics, hired Sue C. Hughey
to prepare an historical map of Texas. 9  The contract called for a
total compensation of $4,500 payable in installments.191
Upon reviewing Hughey's layout, Palographics was dissatisfied
with her work and decided to terminate its agreement with her.
192
Palographics then hired other artists to complete the poster-map
without Hughey's permission.193 Before Palographics' new artists
completed the map, Hughey applied for and received from the Reg-
ister of Copyrights a certificate of registration for the preliminary
187. See McKinney, 660 F. Supp. at 1011-12.
188. See Lerman, 10 F.3d at 109 ("[R]escission... is permitted only when
the other party's breach is 'material and willful, or, if not willful, so substantial
and fundamental as to strongly tend to defeat the object of the parties in mak-
ing the contract."') (quoting Callanan v. Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 752 (N.Y.
1910)); see also Anderson v. Lifeco Servs. Corp., 881 F. Supp. at 1504 (noting
that where a breach is substantial or material, a party may rescind a contract if
"the injury caused is irreparable, or... damages would be inadequate, diffi-
cult, or impossible to assess") (quoting Wall v. Foster Petroleum Corp., 791
P.2d 1148, 1150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)).
189. 189 U.S.P.Q. 527 (D. Colo. 1976).
190. See id. at 528.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 529.
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layout of the poster-map. 194 Hughey brought a claim for infringe-
ment when Palographics later printed, published, and distributed the
map.
195
In challenging the validity of Hughey's copyright, Palographics
argued that it owned the material under a work made for hire theory
and that Hughey's only recourse was to bill Palographics for her
services in accordance with the contract or based on a quantum mer-
uit. 19 6  Hughey contended that Palographics had unilaterally re-
scinded its contract with Hughey. 197 The court agreed with Hughey
and held that any such contract was null and void. 198 Palographics
had repudiated and terminated its contract with Hughey when it in-
formed Hughey of its dissatisfaction with her work. 199 Furthermore,
the fact that Palographics did not pay or in any way compensate
Hughey further supported Hughey's argument that Palographics had
repudiated the contract.20 0  Since the presumption of ownership
which Palographics claimed was only applicable to contracts which
are satisfied by both parties,20' Palographics could not have been en-
titled to ownership of the copyright by merely having "obligated
themselves to pay for the [map]," when, in reality, they failed to ful-
fill this obligation to Hughey. 02 Evidence that an employer failed to
pay for an employee's services thus sufficiently rebuts the presump-
tion of copyright ownership in favor of the person at whose instance
the work is done.
20 3
If an employee is able to recapture the copyright in his or her
original work of authorship by virtue of a material breach or repu-
diation by the employer who refuses to pay the artist, why could this
remedy not be expanded into other types of material breaches as
well? Although the cases supporting the copyright reversion theory
have to date only dealt with an employer's refusal to pay, there is no
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 532.
197. See id. at 529.




202. See id. (emphasis added).
203. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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reason why this rationale should not be expanded to breaches of
promises that are as equally fundamental, essential and material to an
employment contract. Among the terms negotiated for in employ-
ment agreements, an employee may desire and thus specifically con-
tract to maintain creative control over his or her work.
In McKinney v. Gannett Co.,204 the former owner of a newspa-
per was allowed to rescind the sale of his newspaper based on the de-
fendant's breach of his employment contract. The plaintiff, Robert
M. McKinney, owned all of the stock of The New Mexican and acted
as the newspaper's editor-in-chief and publisher.205  In 1975,
McKinney negotiated with Gannet 06 for the transfer of all the
shares of common stock of The New Mexican to Gannett in return for
300,000 shares of Gannett common stock.
20 7
Prior to the closing of this transaction, McKinney and The New
Mexican agreed to the terms of an employment agreement. 20 8 The
employment agreement gave McKinney, as editor-in-chief, total
control of the news and editorial policies at The New Mexican for ten
years, subject only to budget limitations.20 9 The agreement also
granted McKinney complete control of the business operations of
The New Mexican for another five years. 21  Thus, "in return for
Gannett stock, McKinney transferred to Gannett his ownership of
The New Mexican and carved out for himself a reserved interest of
control and management for a period of years."
211
The court found that Gannett breached its employment agree-
ment with McKinney, "by a course of conduct in which it was made
clear to McKinney that his reserved right to control and manage the
newspaper would no longer be honored. 2 12  The employment
204. 660 F. Supp. 984 (D.N.M. 1981), aff'd, 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
205. See id. at 989.
206. Gannett was a Delaware corporation which owned over eighty newspa-
pers and several radio and television stations. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. Because Gannett acquired The New Mexican by virtue of the
"Reorganization Plan," the court found that the parties to the Employment




211. Id. at 1012.
212. Id.
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agreement had granted to McKinney complete control over the news
and editorial policies of all of the publications at The New Mexi-
213can. The agreement had also given McKinney complete authority
over The New Mexican news and editorial employees.214 Gannett
deliberately and repeatedly broke these promises by, among other
things, failing to follow McKinney's instructions concerning a politi-
cal endorsement for the New Mexico partisan primary elections in
early June 1978,215 firing McKinney's general manager,216 and se-
lecting and hiring a new general manager, without first consulting
McKinney.217 Based on these breaches of his employment agree-
ment with Gannett, McKinney brought a claim for rescission of the
contract in which he conveyed his ownership of The New Mexican to
Gannett.
218
In order for McKinney to achieve rescission of his entire agree-
ment with Gannett, which included the sale of his newspaper to Gan-
nett, he had to show that the employment agreement and the stock
transfer agreement were parts of an inseparable contract such that the
breach of the employment agreement was a breach of the entire
agreement.219 The test of inseparability was "whether the parties as-
sented to all the promises as a single whole, so that there would have
been no bargain whatever if any promise or set of promises were
struck out."
220
The court found that McKinney's rights to control and manage
the newspaper were so substantial and fundamental that without
them, McKinney's basic objective of making the bargain was
213. See id. at 993.
214. See id. at 996.
215. See id. at 993.
216. See id. at 998, 1000.
217. See id. at 1001.
218. See id. at 988.
219. See id. at 1005.
220. Id. (citations omitted). Here the district judge found the contracts to be
inseparable in spite of the fact they were contained in two different documents.
See id. at 1006. The documents referred to each other but more importantly, it
was "[a] peculiarity relating to the subject matter of th[e] two documents
[which] suggests their inseparability: essentially, what McKinney did was
transfer ownership of his newspaper to Gannett while retaining control of it for
himself for a period of years. The Employment Agreement itself d[id] more
than promise employment and compensation for McKinney." Id.
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completely frustrated.22 1 The court also found that the employment
agreement and the stock transfer agreement were inseparable such
that breach of the latter would allow rescission of both. Accordingly,
the court entered judgment in favor of McKinney allowing him to
elect rescission as a remedy.
222
In a copyright setting, the contract of employment necessarily
involves the transfer of intellectual property from the employee to his
or her employer by virtue of the presumption in the work made for
hire doctrine. However, employees may divest themselves of copy-
rights either through an actual employment agreement or a separate
writing. McKinney seems to indicate that although an injured party
may rescind an employment agreement that involves the transfer of
some unique property right by a separate writing, the employment
agreement and the separate writing must be "inseparable" for the
purposes of rescinding both agreements.
Unlike the McKinney court, the court in Royal v. Leading Edge
Products, Inc.22 3 did not allow the plaintiff to rescind an agreement
conveying the copyright in a software program he created.224 Lead-
ing Edge Products, Inc. (Leading Edge), a Massachusetts corpora-
tion, was involved in various facets of the computer industry and
hired James Royal to manage its word processing development de-
partment.225 At some later point, Royal and a co-worker entered into
a royalty agreement with Leading Edge regarding the development
of the software package. 2 26 Royal and his co-worker agreed to de-
velop a software package for Leading Edge in exchange for stipu-
lated royalty payments based on future sales. 22 7 The royalty agree-
ment provided that if Royal was terminated for no cause, he would
be entitled to royalties for a period of "five (5) years from the date of
termination."
228
Leading Edge eventually terminated Royal's employment.
Leading Edge then failed to pay the royalties allegedly due to him.
221. See id. at 1012.
222. See id. at 1044.
223. 833 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
224. See id. at 3.
225. See id. at 1.
226. See id.
227. See id.
-228. Id. at 2.
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While Royal conceded that the copyright to the software package in-
ured to his employer by virtue of the work made for hire doctrine,
229
he attempted to argue, like the plaintiff in McKinney, that the com-
pany's refusal to pay royalties was related to his employment agree-
ment. 23  If the two agreements were related, a material breach of
one-the royalty agreement-would entitle Royal to rescind both.23'
If Royal could have rescinded -his employment agreement with
Leading Edge, the copyright in the software package would have re-
verted to Royal.
232
However, unlike McKinney, the contractual relationship estab-
lished between Royal and Leading Edge by virtue of the royalty
agreement was entirely "separate and distinct" from their employ-
ment relationship:
233
The royalty agreement makes clear that the trade-off for the
proprietary copyright interest is not a job, but payment of
royalties .... It makes explicit provision with respect to
what consequences will flow from termination of the
author's employment-whether for cause, without cause, or
in the event of Royal's voluntary departure.... Reversion
of the copyright is not among those consequences.
234
Royal would not have fared any better for rescinding either
agreement. He could not plead the existence of an element essential
to recover under the copyright reversion theory: breach of the em-
ployment agreement. In fact, Leading Edge's breach of the royalty
agreement occurred after Royal's employment relationship with
Leading Edge had been terminated. Thus, if the royalty agreement
stood, Royal's only remedy for Leading Edge's breach was money
damages, not rescission of his employment contract and subsequent
reversion of the copyright. 235  On the other hand, if the royalty
agreement was subject to rescission, as Royal had suggested, then




233. See id. at 4. The court stated that "there [was] neither authority nor
precedent for the assertion that a breach of a royalty agreement alone catalyzes
an implicit exception to the work-made-for-hire doctrine." Id.
234. Id. at 3.
235. See id.
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that agreement would have vanished and Royal would have been left
with no written instrument indicating the parties' intent with respect
to copyright ownership in the software package. Without the written
and signed agreement, Leading Edge was author by virtue of the pre-
sumption created in § 201(b) of the Copyright Act.236 Because there
was no breach of the employment agreement entitling Royal to re-
scission, Leading Edge remained owner of the copyright.
Cases involving more than one set of agreements or contracts
add a twist to the idea that an aggrieved employee may rescind his or
her employment contract. When read together, McKinney and Royal
mean that where there are two separate agreements, the contract
sought to be rescinded based on a material breach must be insepara-
ble from the employment agreement in order for both to be re-
scinded. The Royal case also supports the argument that there may
be claims for rescission and copyright ownership where transfers of a
creator's copyright are accomplished by virtue of the employment
agreement, as opposed to separate and distinct royalty agreements.
Appropriation of an idea, if its disclosure is exchanged in con-
sideration for an employment contract, may also be heard on contract
theory, and a claim for breach of contract may sufficiently set forth a
claim for copyright ownership.237 James Trenton was a radio an-
nouncer and talk show host in Los Angeles.238 Infinity Broadcasting
of Los Angeles, Inc. (Infinity) owned and operated KROQ, 106.7
FM in Burbank, California (KROQ).239 When Trenton first began
broadcasting on KROQ, he worked without compensation in order to
gain experience in the radio business.2 40 He began receiving a salary
for his on-air segments in 1982.241 In early 1983, Trenton conceived
a radio program format called "Loveline."242 In creating the format,
Trenton sought to devise a radio talk show that would mirror real life
236. See id.
237. See Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416 (C.D. Cal.
1994); see also Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1984) ("While an
idea is not property and is not subject to copyright... its disclosure may be
valid consideration for a contract.").
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discussions among friends regarding social relations, dating, and
sexuality.243 Trenton eventually introduced a medical expert co-host
to enhance the program's on-air chemistry and to lend credibility to
the medical advice given on the air.244 Loveline aired once a week
during a late night, two-hour time slot.245
Trenton eventually signed a three-year employment agreement
with KROQ in November 1988, several months after Infinity had
purchased the station.246 Shortly thereafter, station management in-
formed Trenton that they wanted to broadcast Loveline five nights a
week, rather than one, due to its increasing popularity.247 In ex-
change for agreeing to broadcast the show five nights a week-and
giving up the substantial income that he was earning by making late
night personal appearances-Trenton was promised increases in his
regular salary, complete discretion in the number and nature of ce-
lebrity guests appearing on the show, exclusive recognition for the
creation of the program, and the exclusive right to perform the show
as lead host.248 Infinity also promised Trenton to repay a substantial
loan Trenton had taken out to start a clothing business, to syndicate
Loveline if it became successful airing five nights a week, and to
continue to contract with Trenton's medical expert for his services as
a co-host on the show.249
Loveline became extremely successful, becoming the "fourth
most listened to program in Los Angeles, behind only the three most
popular morning programs."250 Trenton's relationship with his em-
ployer, however, became increasingly strained.25' Infinity suspended
Trenton for inviting his listeners to discuss an incident involving a
West Hollywood record store during an event sponsored by
KROQ.252 Infinity later suspended Trenton for mentioning the name
of another radio announcer, also employed by Infinity, on the air
243. See id.




248. See id. at 1419-20.
249. See id.
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after being told by the station not to use the "competition's name"
2 53
in his program. Trenton was suspended again after he and his medi-
cal expert co-host staged a dispute during which Trenton "walked off
the show., 2 54  Infinity suspended Trenton again seven months
later. 5 Trenton alleged that the last suspension was in retaliation
for the disagreement between himself and Infinity over the owner-
ship of Loveline 6 The suspensions occurred during a time period
when negotiations over the ownership of the potential syndication
rights in Loveline broke down and after Trenton's attorney sent a
letter to Infinity asserting Trenton's ownership rights in Loveline.
257
After the last suspension, Infinity hired a new permanent lead host
for Loveline. z58 Trenton remained under the contract after his sus-
pensions and continued to draw a salary.
259
After Infinity suspended Trenton's employment and refused to
pay him an increased salary, Trenton brought a suit asserting owner-
ship rights in broadcasts of the radio format he allegedly created.260
The court first determined that the radio broadcasts, because they had
been simultaneously recorded, were copyrightable material.26 1 On
the issue of whether Trenton or Infinity owned the copyrights in the
recorded Loveline programs, the court decided that the copyrightable
interest was created in the scope of Trenton's employment. 262 Since
Trenton did not plead the existence of any written agreement ex-
pressly naming him as owner of the programs, the court found that
Infinity owned the copyright interest in the recorded programs under
the work-for-hire doctrine.
2 63
Although the court ultimately dismissed Trenton's lawsuit, it






258. See id. at 1421.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 1420-22. Radio broadcasts, if simultaneously recorded, fall
within copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1994).
261. See Trenton, 865 F. Supp. at 1423-25.
262. See id. at 1426.
263. See id.
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copyrights based on contract theory.264 Trenton properly alleged
breach of contract based on his employer's agreement to compensate
him for his ideas, that such compensation would increase as Loveline
became more popular, and that Infinity failed to fulfill either obliga-
tion. Trenton further alleged that Infinity agreed to give him com-
plete control and discretion regarding the number and nature of
guests appearing on the show. Lastly, Trenton alleged that Infinity
agreed to continue to give him exclusive recognition as creator of the
radio show broadcasts. Assuming that Trenton could prove that
these terms were material to his signing the employment agreement
with Infinity, and that Infinity's conduct completely frustrated Tren-
ton's objectives in making the contract, Trenton would have a strong
claim for rescission of his employment contract under the rationale
of McKinney. Upon rescission of the contract, the copyright to
Loveline would revert to Trenton. Trenton could then attempt to ne-
gotiate with other radio stations to broadcast the show and sue Infin-
ity for restitution, or the reasonable value of his services.
IV. CONCLUSION
A copyright entitles its owner to enforce exclusive reproduction,
performance, and display rights against the world.265 Where an em-
ployee creates a work within the scope of his or her employment and
receives a salary or wages and benefits, the work for hire doctrine
vests initial ownership of the copyright in the employer.
This Comment has discussed situations where the employer
should no longer be entitled to copyright ownership which it ac-
quired by virtue of the work for hire presumption. Initial ownership
of the copyright vests in the employer by virtue of its relationship
with its employee. Both the employee and the employer contract for
specific rights under an employment agreement. Where an employer
fails to fulfill its obligations under the contract and the employee is
no longer able to receive the benefit of the bargain for which he or
she contracted, the employer should no longer be allowed to benefit.
from the copyright. An employer's material breach should suffi-
ciently rebut the employer's implied right to authorship. Courts
264. See id. at 1429.
265. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
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should expand and continue to apply this exception to the work for
hire doctrine where the employer has materially breached any term
of an employment agreement. Upon a finding of material breach by
an employer, the employee could then elect to rescind the employ-
ment agreement, allowing him or her to recapture the copyright, and
sue for restitution to recover payment for his or her services.
Chau Vo*
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